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THE

ISRAELI

STATE
by Larry Hochman

Ahl ANAL '-"SIS OF THE JUNE WAR
It is hard for many Jews to realize or accept the fact that the central event in their contemporary ethnic lives - genocide at the hands of the Nazis - . )s an historical occurrence that is neither emotionally nor politically compelling for
most of the earth's peoples. To feel deeply about other peoples' catastrophes is a luxury afforded only to those who are
sufficiently advanced economically and astute politically to be reflective on a broad scale. While the peoples of Asia
and Africa, or at least those among them who are free from the overriding concerns of day to day survival, might reasonably be expected to empathize with the victir-.$ of Iii rf"c; hima , they cannot be expected to comprehend or be shaken
by the liquidation of millions of foreign people who lived in another milieu. In particular, the Jewish disfJ ~ter in
Europe was not a major event in the history of the Arab~ -- or wot. Id not have been in the natural course of events in
the Arab wo~d.
My posi ; ;lJ n on the imnedi a :-e ": ents of May and Ju ne 1S _7 is as k

~("Y.l S:

1. The removal of the t I '0utfer forces from E (~/'i/ icln terr ito ry , tr'" .novement of Egyptian troops to its own borders in
Sinai, the Egyptian de c !::J r.:-. ti u:· of irl tent tn b loc ka .•a the G u lf t ''-Ia~la, and the paper agreement to put the Arab armies under a joint comm ·d were all essentially politi cc f moves , ti ke !,I! in response to pressures from Syria. Syria was
itself undPr thr e a t or n , ;k from Israel because of borde r r')i ds from Syr k m territory.
2. Egypt, and C'E" tainly Jordan and Syria, had neither the inte ntio !. (0 : !past not in 1967) nor the capabi lity of making war on Israel.
3. Israel's gove rn me \' ~ and intelligence a g enci hoo prh.Jr k nc, 'v'l IC" '}'_'
and probably kl"' e'vv the lack of intention.

.r the

Arab weakness, separate ly or lcgether l

4. Israel took advantage of an extremely provocative !), fuation and used it as an excuse to attempt
long-standing political and territorial aims.

'[Q

effect certain

5. Israel had recourse to other than a military response, was in no danopr of exti nction and knew it, and has weakened its long-range security interests by its invasion of the Arab state~ .
In the day~ before the June 5 war, it was well-publi cized that Moshe Dayan, the hero of the 1956 Sinai war, was
brought into the ' ~ rae l i government as defense minister. It was significa nt enough in itself that this hard-line protege of David Ben Gurion entered the cabi net, but a far mG, e si gn i fir-an' tl: J gh less we II-known move was the gran ti ng
of two cabinet posts to the Her u~ party ,
One would have to be v , ,~ ed In Zio:,; ,. r:lsro ry !.- Jrmp tL<:, import of t his e ve nt. In the 19 years of Israeli statehood,
Herut had been e xc luded from every governme nt. H er ut is t he Isra el i po Ii t i c a l manifestation of the world-wide
United Zionist - Revisioni r;rs whose founder, Vladm ir Jabotinsk y hoped to model the Jewish State along the line s of
Mussolini's Corporate Sta te. Herut is the most chauvinistic, most violently anti-Ara b , anti-labor , irredentist of
Israelis political groupings. Its slogan has always been la Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan'. Its military
organization before the establishment of Israel - the Irgun Zvai Leu mi - carr ied out the massacre of the Arab vi lIage
of Deir Yassin, near Jerusalem.
To give an idea of the depth 'I f r ')sti :. ~ y b e l ,ve e '" the R·
'1ists a nd the Israeli establishment, the Irgun, under its
leader Menachem Beigen (who now sits in the cabi net),
!,t in a shipload of arms to Tel Aviv port in 1948 r-l 'Jri ng
the first UN truce of Israelis War of Independence. The arm5 were rr. l-.1 , j. --d --: !y r . the Irgun -- and Israel was in
desperate need of arms at that time. But Ben Gurion, the provisiona l premie r , fc~~lrfl -:I to strengthen the Irgun a nd
concerned over the political ramifications of so open a truce violation, took the unpopular step of blowing th e shi p ,
the Altalena, out of the water. Despite the venom between the parties of the former governments and He ru t \which
draws about a 15% vote}, Herut for the first time entered the government in the last days of May.
One of the parties in the Israeli government - Mapam, a left-w ing socialist party - sent out a news bulletin to its
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friends in the United States dated 1 June 1967 -- four days before the war.
added):

I quote from that bulletin (with emphasis

Mapam opposes changes in the makeup of the government because their practical meaning is the addition
of radical groups who demand exploitation of our immediate advantage ... The reason given was to exploit
the existing military advantage ... (We) though t it right to utilize every polit ,cal action ... We are for
~xploitation of political negotiati?~ •.. A strained peace is better than war.
Knowing Mapam, its leaders and its thinking, I regard this as evidence that at least part of the Israeli government regarded the Egypfian moves as political (hence the call for a politicai ,esponse), that the majority in the government
chose to make a military response to this political challenge, that the government knew its own strangth vis-a-vis its
adversaries, and knew very well the distinction between the inflam matory threats of Ahmed Skukeiry (of the Palestine
Liberation Organization) and actual military capability . (Military ladvantage l is an understatement. According to
James Reston in the New York Times of 28 June 1967, the US Joint Chie fs of Staff and the CIA gave Johnson a report
that 'Israel would win in a few days even if the Arabs made the first major s~rike from the air. I)

As to that part of the fifth point dealing with possible Israeli responses other than military, the 14 June 1967 Times
quoted from an interview in the French weekly, Le Nou vel Observateur, with a Ihi:::Jh Soviet official I. Before the
shooting started, according to this account, the Americans proposed to Kosygin fhat the US would compensate Israel
for accepting a compromise or. sh;pping in the Gulf of Aqaba and offer major assista nce to Egypt and Syria whi Ie the
Soviet Union would begin a parallel aid program. Kosygin is said to have regarded this favorably and as a result of
the US-Russian exchange th~ EgYFtian Vice President Mohieddine was invited to Washington. (The war began before
he reached there.) The Sov ie t a ccount was that during May ISoviet intelligence was concerned over an Israeli project to push as far as Damascus and to overthrow t he Syrian government. I (This view is in agreement with the following comment in the June 10 issue of the Briti sh journal The Economist: IThe Russ ians may justifiably have believed
that Israel was getting ready to invade Syria. I) Further, by this account, Nasser massed his troops on the Sinai border
with full Soviet- agreement but later asked for th e with drawal of UN forces and announced the blockade without the
approval or even the knowledge of the Russians.
This potential compromise may well have been unsatisfacto ry to Israel. There were, however, other plan ~ in the offing
as we II, such as bargaini ng off the Aqaba blockad e agai nst a settlement of the Arab refugee question, such as the proposed US and Bri tish test of the announced blockad e of the Ti ran Strai t leadi ng to the Gu If of Aqaba. (A detai led news
analysis in the Times of 10 July confirms this.) The only point is tha t there were othe r responses possible than the militaryone that Israel chose.
The sequence of events concerning Syria dates back to border raids upon Israel from Syrian and Jordanian territory in
late 1966. As reported in the New York Times editions of 15-17 November 1966, Israel launched a daylig ht assault
with tanks, artillery and troops against the Jordanian villages of Es Samu and Jimba. The claim was that Syrian marauders operated out of Es Samu. (In 1956 Israel threatened retali ati on against Jordan, moved troops to the Jordanian
border and then turned upon Egypt. Some UN observers commented that tre attack on Jordan IS vi Ilages might be a
maneuver to divert attention away from an a II-out attack planned on Syria.) The UN truce forces reported to the Security Council that at least 125 houses, one clinic and one school were destroye d at Es Samu. This is the general pattern of Israel i retal iation -- all out of proportion to the provocation. The Securi ty Counci I condemned Israe I, and
Goldberg said, Iisraelis raid into Jordan, tile nature of which and consequences in human lives and destruction far
surpassed the cumu lative total of acts of terrorism aga inst Israe lis fronti ers, ... was a de liberate governmenta I decision •.• a conscious act of responsible leaders .•• an entirely different level from the earlier incidents. I (One might
wonder whether the US spokesman wou Id have been as condemnatory had the Israel i assau It been upon the territory of
the leftist Syrian regime.) In the wake of these attacks Syria and L..,--°ypt coordinated military plans.
In the Times editions of 13 and 14 May 1967, Is raelis prime minister Eshkol was quoted as warning that Israel would not
hesitate to use air power and an Israeli observer stated that Israel Imust use force and the UAR wonlt come in. I The
Times noted that these comments were stronger than those usually heard in responsible quarters. Eshkol further stated
that 'Israel will choose the time, the place and the meam. to counter the aggressor. I At about this time Syria began
taunting Nasser about hiding behind the skirts of the UN buffer force.
Whether or not the Sovi et reports concerni ng Israe l i intentions in Syria were correct, and whether or not the Russians
and/or the Arabs believed them to be correct, the Egyptian actions can be seen as othe r than preparatory to an attack
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upon Israel. At best, if the reports were true or if egypt believed them, the movement of troops would then be seen as
a purel y defensive action. If it is true, as re ported in the September 1967 Ramparts, that Nasser was unprepared for the
quick withdrawal of UN forces, then he made a gross political miscalculation. Even if the Israelis were not fully persuaded (or wished not to be persuaded) that Egypt was not about to attack, there was no doubt in Israel about the outcome
should war occur. Surely the cost of war is less to the country that strikes first (provided it wins). But that is true in
every such situation and thus would be a cogent argument for 'preventive' war in general. {In any case, it was incredibly stupid o f the Egyptian leadersh i~ not to real ize that Israel wou Id respond exactly as it did.)
There is a myth that must be dispelled if any reasonable discussion of Middle East events is to take place. That is the
'David and Goliath' myth, the myth of 'tiny Israel', the myth of Israel's victories being attributable to 'miracles' and
to the 'lack of choice ' -- or 'ein brera' as Israelis are so fond of putting it. The myth has great public relations value.
It bri ngs pnl itical support, emotional support more readi Iy. It makes fund-raising easier. It bui Ids up an aura surrounding the slate. Un fortunately , a people (or part of it) learns to believe its own mythology -- especially when some Arab
sourc.es uncleverly propagate the same myth.
But the fact is that a highly skilled, technically competent, mobile, motivated and relatively rich people is inevitably
going to prevail in large-scale open warfare against a poor and backward people. This is not arguing from hindsight but
from recdity -- a reality made e~ more clear by reflecting on the impotence of Egyptian forces in Sinai in 1956 and,
in mor~ rec e nl days, in the Yemen, a country ba ckward even compared to Egypt.
In analyzing Israel's victory in the New York Times of 8 June 1967, the military editor, Hanson Baldwin, pointed out
the central fact that 'the Arab nations are sti" essentia IIy feuda Iisti c in soci al structure.' This legacy of Turki sh and
British colcnia!ism is in fundamental distinction to Israel's modernity based upon a population with sophisticated European sk i lis and a leve I of development artifi cially sustained by hundreds of mill ions of do liars from Ameri can compatri0ts and German reparations. Israel has a gross national product per head of $1366 whi Ie Egypt has a GN P per head of
but $143 and Syria and Jordan only sl ightly more. Baldwin continues:
Si nce the vaunted superiori ty in numbers of the Arab armies was never brought to bear on the fighting
fronts, Israel probabl y had an over-all numerical superiority in the troops actually involved and a
cl e a t -cut superiority in firepower and mobility in the actual battles.
On the question of Arab propaganda, General E. L.M. Burns, the Canadian who commanded the UN peace force set up
in 1956 and who was chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervisory Organization from 1954 to 1956, made the following
comments in his book Between Arab and Israeli:
In the flood of propaganda which pours constantly out of the Cairo press and radio, there have been many
threats of the direct vengeance on Israel. These have been assiduously collected and published by the Israeli Government (which) argues that what is said must therefore reflect the policy of the responsible au thori ties . This ignores the nature of propaganda, which is not necessarily a statement of intentions of those
wh0 control the propaganda sources, but is a mode of inducing a desired frame of mind in those who listen
to it. (They) want the Arab population to believe that Egypt is implacably hostile to Israel and proposes,
at some indefinite time in the future, to go to war with the object of overwhelming the Israeli sta te. But
it is not proof that they are actually planning to do so.
Further from Burns:
Hosti Ie propaganda has (Nasser) perpetually threateni ng the destruction of Israel, but in none of his speeches
have I found that he has gone beyond the statement (given in) a New York Times interview of 6 October
1955 -- ' ..• No Arab is saying now that we must destroy Israel. The Arabs are asking only that the refugees
receive their natural rights to life and their lost property, which was promised to them by UN resolutions
seven years ago ... No, we are not aggressive. The threat is from the other side. 1
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And more:
Nevertheless, Egypt, if she aspired to the leadership of the Arabs, could not appear weak, could not seem
to submit to Israeli threats and provocations. Therefore there had to be reactions to Israeli blows such as
the Gaza raid. There had to be the appearance of inflexible hostility to Israel and a show of intention to
obtain restitution for the refugees. The authorities could not be too severe on Palestinian Arab infiltrators;
they might even have to devise ways in whi ch the demands of those refugees to be armed and led against
the Israelis cou Id be channelled into forms of hosti Ie action whi ch seemed un Iikely to bring about fu 11scale war.
While the ability, and perhaps the right of Israel to continue as a political nation-state may be questioned, the right
of the Israel i populace to exist is elementary. Any Arab threats of annihi lation of a people, no matter if they are only
rhetorical pronouncements for home consumption, are outrageous and deserve unqual ified condemnation. The psychological pressures operating on a people living under a barrage of ominous threats cannot be discounted. But it is the
responsibility of a cou ntry's leadership to apprise its people of the true situation -- of the motivation behind Arab
propaganda and of actual military strengths.
It is uni lIuminating to discuss the June war in isolation from all that has gone before.

ZIONISM AND THE FORMATION OF THE ISRAELI STATE
To become more fundamental , the central issue in Southwest Asia is the fact that a Jewish state has been established in
the Arab midst without the invitation or consent of the indigenous population . The Jewish immigration occurred, and
could only have occurred, under the aegis of Western colonial rule. (The old slogan was that early Zionism was a handmaiden of British imperia !ism.) The creation of Israel caused almost a mi" ion Arabs to become refugees. Israel treats
its remaining Arabs as an unde rclass. It maintains its artifically high standard of living only because of outside re sources "
IsraE!J has allied itself with Western colonial and exploitative interests by its down-the-line support for the French in Al geria, by its close relations with South Africa, by its joining with British and French colonialist forces in their attempt
to regain control at Suez.

If the days of United States and other Western influence and control in the Middle East are numbered, then to the extent that Israel places its hopes for survival and prosperity on Western alliances and on a Western orientation -- to that
extent its aspirations are placed in jeopardy. Even those Israelis and those friends of Israel who also are supporters of
American policy aims around the world and who are therefore happy about the close identification between the US and
Israel, should be farsighted enough to realize the disaster that can eventually result from such close identification.
Conditions in the Arab world are such as to make likely, at some point, the emergence of genuine revolutionary forces .
The US response, judging from past and present experience, is not too difficult to imagine. And there is no guarantee
that any US counter-revolutionary response will be successful. If Israel continues to support imperialist interests, then
to Arabs and many others it will continue to be regarded as a European import into Asia, a foreign and artificial creation sharing none of the aspirations of Asians and Africans and, indeed, standing in opposition to these aspirations. Although the tremendous disparity in Arab and Jewish populations is, militarily, a total irrelevance for the present, in
the long run the Arab population advantage - combined with the inevitable productivization of the Arab states - will
not be at all irrelevant.
The classical Zionist position is that the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine is an interrupted event. A 2000-year
exi Ie, because of unique circumstances, has not led to the elimination of separate Jewish identity. Thus the Zionist
claim on Palestine is rooted in history. Furthermore, Israel was established partially in response to a problem confronting European Jewry. There is surely no need to recount the horror of Auschwitz and Treblinka. But there may be need
of remembering that the survivors of the holocaust languished in Displaced Persons camps for two to three years. Leaving aside the desirabi lity of an independent Jewish state and the preferences of those survivors, there simply were no
open doors to England and America. There was only Palestine, first illegally and dramatically in the face of the British blockade, then openly after the creation of Israel.
This does not mean, however, that in the absence of a Jewish state the survi vors would still be in DP camps . It is
hardly likely that French and German economic recovery wou Id have taken place around hundreds of thousands of Jews
behind fences. Once the Marshall Plan was effected the Jews WOuld have been settled somewhere. {That would have
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meant 1947- 1948 -- and the DP camps were cleared only in 1948- 1949 in any case.} At the same time that the US was
barring its doors to all but a trickle of Jews, it was pushing, albeit reluctantly and hesitatingly, for the creation of Israel. The UN partition plan passed by one vote.- Had there been just one more independent African or Asian country
in the UN in November 1947 the plan wou Id have fai led. In that event, it is almost a certainty that under pressures
from a large Ameri can Jewish community, from humanitarian imperatives, and from the necessity of removing the DP
camps from the midst of resurging Western capitalist economies, the US would have let some Jews in and would have
seen to it that England, Argentina, Brazil, etc., let the rest in. There is little doubt that many of the Jewish survivors
would have opted for America. The prospect of emigrating to an unfamiliar region of Asia when their relatives and
friends had come to the US by the mi Ilions must have appeared bleak to many. America was their 'promised land', not
Palestine.
The obvious question is why a problem brought on by Christianity and by European fascism should be solved in an Asian
co ntext at the expense of the native population. And to speak of a 2000 year old Jewish existence as justification is
to invite chaos in the world as it presently exists. The road of claims on historic territories is not the road to world
peace and equality even if the historic claim is coupled with the immediate problem arising from contemporary European politics.
Jewish immig ration to Palestine began in the 1800s and was given British sanction by the Balfour Declaration of 1917.
The impetus for the migration was the desire for Jewish nationhood. But in the twentieth century it is no longer possible fo r the na ti onalisms of the advanced countries to be progressive. European nationalism - and Zionism is a part of
it - ca n only be retrograde. The only healthy nationalisms are those of the colonial and recently colonial countries,
a nd eve n these have many unhealthy aspects.
J ews left Eu ro pe because of pogroms, ghettoization and landlessness. Jews came to Palestine while it was under Turkish as we ll as Bri ti sh control. Zionists fall into a political spectrum. Whi Ie some Zionist groups certainly were 'handma ide ns o f British imperialism', others were socialists who set up collective farms and advocated a bi-national state.
The po int is that the desire for Jewish nationhood grew out of persecution and the struggle for survival.
These, however, were European problems. Furthermore, some European Jews - Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, for example had ot he r so lutio ns for Jewish existence in Europe. The vast majority of Jews who left came to America. Years later
these Jewish immigrants to America furnished the means by which other European Jews bought their way into Palestine.
Zionist organizations bought land from absentee landlords, but the Arab fellaheen whose forebears had worked those
lands for thirteen centuries were often removed.
Sometimes the purchased land was empty I but it is a rather unique event to buy a country -- even when you pay 'top
dollar ' for the land! The Turks and the British and the reactionary Arab landowners beholden to the co lonial rulers allowed European Jews to buy a country. If the Pa lesti nians had had a say in the matter this cou Id neve r have been done.
One wonders at the moral i ty of the Zion ists who thought nothi ng of buying the land out from under its people at the behest of colonial overlords. (It should be noted that early Zionist literature and discussion centered entirely on the question of the correct Jewish path. If there was any appreciation by the Zionist theoreticians that human be;'lgs already
lived in Palestine it was well hidden. Even the left-wing socialist-Zionist Ber Borochov in his 'Nationalism and the
Class Struggle' contented himself with the sole observation that 'normal relations between the Jews and Arabs wi II and
must pre vail' , while his editor added the remark that 'the Jewish colonists were harassed by Arab thieves and murderers'.)
Some Zionists were West European Jewish capitalists engaging in business ventures with manpower often supplied by
Impoverished East European Jews. Some focused on the solution of Jewish problems to the exclusion of all else. Some
argued that th e Arabs had let their land rot for centuries and that therefore the Jews had a right to try their hand.
Some Zionists justified their position by contending that the Jews would incidentally raise the 'level of Arab life. And
some sincerely hoped to cooperate with the Arabs in Jewish-Arab fraternity.
Had the question been only that of a haven, the ideal solution would have been for the Arabs to grant permission for
Jew 3 and anyone else to enter Palesti~ntingent only on the absorptive capacity of the land. Jews would then have
lived as and alongside the Arab inhabitants, not at their expense. Such generosity might more reasonably be expected
from a vast and wealthy country like Canada which can absorb millions of additional people and which is not in the
mi dst () f th e typ e o f struggle to estab Iish its national identi ty after centuri es of colonial domination as is the Arab world.
(Of interest in this connection is the Evian Conference on refugees called by President Roosevelt in July 1948. Canada
was among the 31 nations represented at Evian, refused to be committed and, in the event, allowed in precious few
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exi les. The other participants pledged token immigration or none at all -- with the exception of the Dominican Republic which, to everyone's incredulity, offered to receive 100,000 Jews from Germany and Austria provided that settlement expenses did not fall on itself. The Zionist leadership showed no enthusiasm for the Dominican offer nor for the
whole Evian enterprise -- for obvious reasons.)
The Palestinian Arabs, being under colonial domina ti on, were in no position to offer haven even had they been so inclined. The pressing problems of European Jewry did not await the passing of colonialism.

THE BEARING OF JEWISH HISTORY
To go back even further, the history of Jewish Palestine ended in the year i 35 with the destruction and ploughing up
of the site of Jerusalem by the Romans . Jews spread thems e lves over most of the rest of the world and only a few thousand remained in Palestine . For 500 years Palestine remained unuer Roman and Byzantine rule.
Th e history of Arab Palestine began in the seventh cent'Jry wh2n t~€. Arab peoples left the Arabian desert and occupied
Syria (of wh ich Palestine was a part), Iraq, Persia, Egypt, the w:lole length of the North African coast, Spain, and the
entire Mediterranean seaboard. Arab sea power commanded the Indian Ocean and contested for command of the Mediterranean. Arab trade eAten(~ ,:=d from Spai n to Zanzibar and beyond to India and China. Arab universities were the
world's centers of learning while Central and Northern Europe remained ir the Dark Ages.
In the eleventh century the Arab states were in ·."aded by the Selju c:k Turks. Then came the Crusaders from Christian
Europe who ruled, off and on, for 200 years. Th e next 200 ycorz saw Pa:estine revert to Moslem rule under the Mamluk
dynasty in Egypt, dur ing whi ch period it, wi th Syr ia , was sub 1e cted to th e devistating Me .lgo l raids of Ha lagu and
Tamerlane. In 1517 Palestine, Syria, and Egypt we re conquere by the OttofYla n Turks a nd in the hands of the Ottoman Sultans at Constanti no ple they remained, except Fo !" I-hc F~ ""'o., ths of Napoleon's invasion and the few years of
Mohammed Ali's occupation, until Worl d War I.
Conquered, neglected and poor, Palestine remained the ",ome o f the Arc.; ~ who had lived in it for 1300 years .
Jewish history, meantime, had ceased to be the history of Palest ine . Abo ut 700 years before the disaster of l'3.5, a
lorge and prosperous Jewish community grew up in Iraq (Mesopotam ia). The Iraqi Jews rmintained communal autonomy
and shared in the great days of the Arab Cal iphate at Baghdad unti I the eleventh century. In Egypt there was a flourishi ng Jewish community, complete Iy Hellenized, active in all fie Ids of Egyptian life, rising to high posts in t he or rny
and administration, participating in the cultural achievements of Alexandria. From 135 on, successive waves of Jew ish
emigration went into Syria, the Yemen, Greece and Italy.
It was in Spain that Jewish life attained its highest pOint since the loss of Palestine. Rural life as well as urban was
open to the Jews. When Arab Spain le<;l the world, Jews were vizers to the Caliph, diplomats, financiers, scientists,
physicians, scholars. There was a grea t revival of Hebrew literature and learning. Moses Maimonides (1135-1204),
born in Cordova and later residing in Cairo, was considered the greatest scholar of his age. Spanish Jews ! like the
Egyptian, assimilated in everything but religion. They spoke Arabic, took Arabic names, adopted Arab ways.
The era of persecution of Jews began not in the Moslem bu t in th e Christia n w.~~· ~~
By the beginning of the 13th century, the Crusaders drove the Arabs out of Spain (except Granada). Jews who had .""')igrated to England, France and Germany were expropriated, massacred, and fina lIy expel led. In 1492 the Inqui si tion
expelled all Jews who refused conversion to Christianity. Jews went to Turkey, to the Balkans, to Saionika f to Central
Europe where they were kept rigidly apart from Christians , confined to ghettos, obliged to wear yellow badges. More
than half the world's Jews eventually were expelled to the eastern fr,,,,,as of Europe -- Lithuania, Poland and Hungary.
This region fell, by the mid-17th century, first to Cossack and then to Russian conquest. A territorial ghetto - the :Pal~
of Settlement' - was established from the Baltic north of Warsaw to the Black Sea near Odessa to keep Jews from per-
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meating Russia. Throughout this area the urban ghetto system was im?ose:l.
Jews had been reduced from perhaps four million in the early days of the dispersion to about one and a half million by
1700. The ghetto system made the 'peculiar people' more oeculiar. Separated from the land in feudal Europe where
the populations were mainly on the land, the gulf between Jews and the native inhabitants widened. Herded tugether
within ghetto gates, the Jews clung passionately to their tradition, ceremonies and customs -- and now to their artisan
and mercanti Ie urban occupational tasks.
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic era brought emanci~ation to Western European Jews. But pogroms in Eastern Europe and anti-Semitism in West Europe (dramatized by the Dreyfus Case) led to a Jewish migration to America.
(Something like 4.5 million Jews came to the United States between 1870 and 1930.) These causes also led to Zionism.

EARLY JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE
ihe few thousand Jews who had always lived in Palestine spoke Arabic only, and there was no apparent schism between
them and the Moslem and Christian peasants among whom they lived. They were equally exposed to maraudi ng tribesmen from the Lebanon and from across the Jordan. By the middle 1800s there were not more than 12,000 Jews in Palestine.
The bulk of European Jewish refugees went westward, but a minority made its way to Palestine. Zionism originated in
Russia but was backed by Western Jewry. In 1860 the Alliance Israel ite Universelle was founded in France for the assistance of persecuted Jews and some years later it opened an agricultural school near Jaffa. A similar Anglo-Jewish
Association was created in 1871. But the most effective aid to the settlement of Jews in Palestine was rendered by
Baron Edmond de Rothschi Id who between 1883 and 1900 made himself responsible for a group of seven pioneer colonies
and established a fund for maintaining and extending the process of colonization. As a result the Jews in Palestine
grew from about 25,000 in 1881 to more than 80,000 in 1914. Most of them settled in Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa and
their suburbs but nearly 12,000 were on the land , distribu tf·d among 43 co IQr.ies.
There was a differen ce between the newcomers and the old Jewish res:clents in Palestine -- a difference which was to
become more marked in later years. The old residents, especially in the 'holy cities' of Hebron, Safed and Tiberias,
had long since adapted themselves to life among the Arabs. But the new immigrants brought with them a new idea.
They were not going to merge themselves in the life of Palestine as they found it. They were going to make a distinct
life of their own, to build up a Jewish society and to make it the vehicle of a revival of Jewish c u lture and the Hebr~_ w
language.
Zionism entered the field of practical politics when in 1897 Theodor Herzl, a Viennese playwright and journalist,
spurred to action by the Dreyfus Case, convened a congress of world Jewry at Basle and founded the Zionist organizu ~
tion. As its first President he set himself to obtain a chart er for Jewish colonization in Palestine from the Sultan of Turke y . But as the Turks disliked the increase in jewish immigration, Herzl realized the necessity of obtaining the backing
of a powerful European government, and for that he turned to England. The idea of re-establishing the Jews in Palestine
had attracted more attention in England than elsewhere. As early as 1840 Lord Shaftesbury had proposed a scheme of
Jewish colonization as a means or uri lizing the 'wealth and industry of the jewish people for the economic development'
of a backward area.' . (It might be surmised that another motivation was to rid England of Jews.)
In the critical days of World War I, England issued the Balfour Declaration (stating sympathy for the establishment of a
Jewish national home in Palestine) in order to enlist Jewish support, part icularly in the US, for the Allies. About two
years earlier in a series of docum ents called the McMahon Correspondence the British committed themselves to recognize Arab independence in the entire Middle Eastern area then ruled by the Ottoman empire excepting Lebanon, the
northern coast of Syria , and ce!"tain areas in southern Arabia. In exchange for this pledge the Arabs, under the leadership of Sharif Husain, revolted against Ottoman rule and assisted the British mi litary effort in the Middle East. The
Arabs had every reason to include Palestine within the area of Arcb independence defined by the McMahon Correspondence. Such an interpretation was further confirmed by the Declaration to the Seven issued by the British Governmen~
in 1918.
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THE EFFECT OF JEWISH IMMIGRATIO N ON PALESTINE
The British Palestine Royal Commissio n Report of 1937 showed considerable insight into Jewish immigration to Palestine:
If the Jews had come to Palestine willing to fuse their life and culture with Arab life and culture, to accept
the language of the majority, to contemplate the possibi lity of being some day ru led by that majority, then it
is conceivable that they might have been as welcome and successful in Palestine as their ancestors in Iraq or
Egypt or Spain in the early days of the Diaspora. But it would have been wholly unreasonable to expect such
an attitude on their part. It would have been the direct negation of Zionism, both on its social or political
and on its cultural side. The Zionists came back to Palestine, on the one hand, to escape from an alientenvironment, to shake off the shadow of the ghetto, to free themse lves from all the drawbacks of 'minority life ' •
On the other hand, they came back inspired with the faith that the Jewish genius, restored to its old horne,
could do things comparable with the things it had done in anci e nt days. Necessari Iy (Hebrew) had to be the
language; necessari Iy Jewish nationalism was intensified by the foundation of the National Home. Enlightened
immigrants might take a highly sympathetic interest in Arab life and culture but there could be no question of
a Jewish fusion or assimi lation with it, sti" less of a subordination.
In pre-war (World War I) days the Jews in Palestine had formed an unobtrusive minority; individually many of
them were dependent on charity for their living while many of the remainder - in particular the colonistsbrought direct and obvious material benefits to the inh abitants of the area in which they settled. The Jewish
immigra nt of the post-war period, on the other hand, is a person of greater energy and initiative. He represents a movement created by an important international organization supported by funds which, judged by
Arab standards , seem inexhaustible. To th e Arabs it rrus t app ear improbable that such competitors wi II in
years to come be content to share the coun tl" y witll :+P rY1 . Thesf- fears have been intensified by the more extreme statements of Zionist policy and tfle Ara bs have corn8 to see in the Jewish imm ig rant not only a menace to their iivelihood but a possible overlord of the future.
Though Jewish immigration and enterprise have been of great advantage to Pa lestine, the direct benefit to
individual Arabs, which alo ne is likely to be appreciated, has been small, almost negligible, by comparison
with what it might have been had the pre-war methods of settlement been continued. When trade depression
and unemployment followed the period o f heavy immigration the indirect benefits which Jewish activities
had hrought to many parts of Palestine we re forgotten and everywhere among the Arab people the Zionist
movement was regarded as the cause of j"he economic problems of the country. The sale of the Sursock lands
and other Jewish land purchases in di s ~Ti cts where the soi I is most productive were regarded as showi ng that
the immigrants would not be cont ent iJ occupy undeveloped areas and that e conomic pressure upon the Arab
popu lation was Iikel y to i IIcrease. in other words, those consequences of Jewish enterprise wni ch have most
closely affected the Arab people haV E:: been such that the Arab leaders could use them as the means of impressing upon their fol/owe -s th at a continuance of Jewish immigration and land purchases cou Id have no
other result than that the Arabs WOLle: in time be deprived of their livelihood and that they, and their
country, migh t ultimately come ul-,de r the politica! domination of the Jews.
The 193/ Commisssion Report continues:
The Arab peasant has at present neither the capital nor the education necessary for intensive cultivation.
The Jew has. But the lack of these two essential requisites does not justify the expropriation of the Arab
to make room for the richer and more enterprising colonist, even though the Arab's conservative methods,
and in some cases his system of land tenure, may delay development. •• The Palestine Government are
confronted with the prospect of repeti tions of the situation now existing at Wadi el Hawareth and of further
calls upon the police to carry out evictions of large bodies of Arab cultivators with no alternative land to
which they can be moved or upon which they can settle. In the past, persons dispossessed have in many
cases been absorbed in the nei ghbouri ng vi lIages; this process, though it may have been possible four or
five years ago, is no longer possible today; the point of absorption has been reached. The plain facts of
the case are that there is no further land available which can be occupied by new immigrants without displacing the present populaiion. (Thi~ , note well, is in 1937i)
If:!, '-::
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,issio n Report brings out a number of additio nal facts 'worth noting. Although Jews constituted less than 8% of
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Arab rural families were londless. Although some families were presumably landless prior to the post World War I Jewish immigration, these figures suggest that pauperization of the indigenous population was a major consequence of the
influx.
The Hope Simpscn Royal Report of 1930, while indicating that Arab unemployment was Iserious and widespread ' and
that it is Iwrong that a Jew from Poland, Lithuania or the Yemen should be admitted to fill an existing vacancy while
in Palestine there are Arab workmen capable of filling that vacancy who are unable to find employment, I added an interesti ng rider to its judgment:
Jewish capital wi II not be brought into Palestine in order to employ Arab labour. It wi II come in with the
definite object of the employment of Jewish labour and not otherwise. The principle of 'derived demand '
wou Id justify the immigration of Jewish labour even when there are Arab unemployed in the country if the
newly-imported Jewish labour is ossured of work of 0 permanent noture, through the introduction of Jewish
capital to provide the work on which that labour is to be employed. It is clearly of no odvantoge to the
unemployed Arab that Jewi sh capi ta I shou Id be prevented from entering the country, ond he is in no worse
position by the importation of Jewish labour to do work in Palestine for which the funds are available by the
simu Itaneous importation of Jewish capital. In fact, he is better off, as the expendi ture of that capi ta I on
wages to Jewish workmen wi II cause , ultimately, a demand for the services of a portion of the Arab unemployed. (With 0 little patience the Arabs could hope to become shoeshiQe boys in their own land.)
Nonetheless, on the basis of this report, the Colonial Secretary, Sydney Webb, issued a White Paper calling for an ultimate cei Iing of 100, 000 additiona I immigrants, onl y 50, 000 of them to be Jewish. Under Zionist pressure, Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald repudiated the White Paper in 1931.
With all its insight, the conclusion of the 1937 Report was of a typical colonialist nature:
The Arab charge that the Jews have obtained too large a proportion of good land cannot be maintained.
Much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamp and uncultivated when it was purchased. Though today, in the Iight of experience gai ned by Jewi sh energy and enterpri se, the Arabs
may denounce the vendors and regret the alienation of the land, there was at the time at least of the
earlier sales little evidence that the owners possessed either the resources or training needed to develop
the land.
(A similar case could be made for white settlers in Africa or, for that matter, for a group of lenterprising'
Iowa farmers who might today set out and intensively cultivate backward regions of Mexico and thereby
claim political hegemony.)

PATHS TOWARD THE FUTURE
But what about the present and the future? Is Israel now legitimate and how is legitimacy established? Is the United
States legitimate after several hundred years (because no-one challenge: its legitimacy) and Israel not so after 20 years?
(It is not possible to equate a 20 year old claim of Arab refugees from Palestine with a 2000 year old Jewish irredentism -in the former case the perpetrators of eviction are still alive and the victims still unsettled.)
Did the UN partition decision - voted with US and Soviet support but with few African and Asian nations yet in membership - establish Israel's legitimacy? How does one compare that decision with, for example, the Geneva decision on
Indo-China? And how does the UN partition decision, motivated largely by the problem of the Jews in the European
DP camps, jibe with an .earlier resolution unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly to the effect 'that the settlement of displaced persons should not be undertaken in any Non-Self Governing Territory without the consent of the
population of that territoryl?
Can Israel survive indefinitely in the Arab world by force of arms and with the help of big powers? To show how transitory such dependence on big-power support is, it is only necessary to recall the positions of the French government
in 1956 and in 1967. Is Israelis situation fundamentally different from that of the whites in Rhodesia, Angola, South
Africa and, formerly, Algeria?
It may seem absurd to speculate about possible ways for Israel to guarantee its long-range survival while its armies sit
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throughout the Arab world in complete mastery. Yet Israel's eventual survival is by no means assured, even if it shoul d
prove able to force peace treaties upon some of the present Arab regimes in their weakened conditions. 11- is possible
for an advanced small people to dominate its much la rger neighbors for a good long time. But not forever and not even
with nuclear weapons -- a weaponry to which Israel is much more vulnerable than her adversaries. Eventually Arab
numbers will tell. The Arab nations are certainly going to develop economically. According to the Economist of 10
June 1967: 'Egypt has a reasonable future. It has got oi I and the Aswan dam is neari ng completion. Its rate of growth
is likely to accelerate (indeed its rapidly mounting food deficits are one sign of an industrial izing society). A large
part of its imports are capital goods. I
Israel can become a garrison state, nurturing only martial values in its people, and attempt always to stay stronger than
the Arab states. Israel can hope that as the Arab states develop they wi II become progressively less hosti Ie to the Jewish state (although I have never heard anything other than unpersuasive hypotheses as to why this should be expected to
occur in the absence of any fundamental changes on Israelis part). Thus this hope may be futi Ie and Israel may one
day face inundation or migration out of Asia.
I take the position that the creation of Israel was an injustice perpetrated against the native Arab population of Palestine and that the policies of Zionism and of Israel have been largely reprehensible. At the same time I egard the Ottom an Turks and the British as the chief criminals for imposing themselves as rulers of the Palestinian peo ple and for
o pening up the Palestinian lands to permanent settlement by another foreign people. It is very difficult, though, to
fu lIy condemn Zionist desi gns upon Palestine. The incredible Jewish suffering in Christian Europe cu 1m i nati ng in the
Hitlerian climax, must serve as explanation !f not as justification. Because of the dynamics of this unique catastrophe,
Zionist coloni2.ation of Palestine must be viewed in a different context than the conqu ests and colonizations of Africa
by settlers from the European imperialist countries, no matter how simi lar in characte r they appear.
Thus the Jews of Israel, at least some of whose roots go back 90 years in Palesti ne - not 2000 years - shou Id have a
right to survival in their present land. This does not necessarily mean that Jewish political statehood must be assured.
Nor does it mean that Jews outside of Israel should be regarded as exiles who may acquire automatic Israeli citizensh ip upon request. I bel ieve that Israel shou Id carry out po Ii ci es that wi" one day make feasible some sort of a federated existence in the Arab region.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE
There rema i ns the compl icated question of how Israel, as a state, can act so as to bri ng about the eventua I federation
which I regard as the best, if not the only possibility for long-term peace.
The steps proposed below have been thought out in terms of Israelis situation prior to the June 5 war. The territorial,
refugee, political and psychological consequences of this war make an analysi~ much more complex. Nevertheless,
the proposals will remain valid in broad outline whatever the immediate outcome.
A significant step would be recrientation of Israeli diplomacy in the world beyond the Arab region. Israelis voting record in the UN is often, although not always, more like that of a Latin American cl ient state than of an independent
Asian nation -- note, for example, its 1967 vote against Pekingls admission to the UN. Israel must disavow such procolonialist policies and actions as previously mentioned and must, instead, use as a model its successful diplomacy
wi th Ghana and Burma.
What might continuation of the policy of the lingathering of the exiles' eventually mean? Ben Gurion told the Israeli
parliament (22 October 1967): 'This country was not meant so Ie Iy for its i nhabi tants but for every Jew throughout the
world.' This idea of unlimited Jewish immigration is a fundamental part of the elan of Zionism. Arabs fear that unlimited immigration into Israel will build up population pressures that will call for expansion beyond Israel's (June 5th)
boundari es. Such expansion is the po Ii cy of Herut, as mentioned, and sometimes of the Ahdut Ha-avoda and Genera I
Zionist parties. As of now the big sources of potential Jewish immigration (Russia and the US) seem unproductive. But
there were hints in Israel, in the last months before the war, about the possibi Iity of a Soviet relaxation of its emigration policy towards Jews. It is not certain what might happen in the years ahead. Where, outside of the newly-occupied lands, would a large new wave of immigrants be settled? According to the Times of 10 February 1958:
If and when Jordan River water becomes available, it is hoped that an additional 250,000 acres can be
tilled. Much of this lies in the zone a few miles south of Beersheba. It will be expensive to farm it and
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difficult to live in it. Beyond this area are many miles of the Negev, bu t they are true desert, and all
the water in the world wou Id not help.
(It might be wondered what would have happened if the Palestinian Arabs had not left, or were not dri ven out, in
1948. How would the present Jews have been accommodated?) After projecting the 1958 Israel i popu la tion figures
to 1965, Genera I Burns states:
This in itself would not produce irresistible pressure for an adventure to increase Israelis Lebens ra um.
But if, combined with population increase, it were not possible for the present standard of living to be
maintained, then a mood for military adventure might develop.
This question of living standard is vital. The Israeli living standard is very high - akin to much of Western Europe and sustained artificially from abroad. This abnormally high living standard separates Israel from her neighbors. (It
is 'abnormal I in that the resources of that Levantine part of the world cannot presently support suc h a standard.) Today the artificial level of life is maintained primarily by American Jewish weal th, which leads d i rectly to the question
of Israelis political orientation. How can Israel offend the notion of its benefactors?
Nevertheless, Israelis long-range interests requi re that it consciously bring its sta ndard of livi ng mo re nearly into line
with its resources and its natural tradi ng outlets. This means, agai n, bui Idi ng for the day of normal re lations wi th the
Arabs. Although it is difficult for a people to reduce its living standard, even gradually, it is in t h is case a worthwhile
sacrifice for real political independence and long-range secu ri ty. Such a gradu al reduction is certain ly preferable to
th e quick and drastic reduction in living standards that would surely occur sho u ld America or American J ews lose intere st in Israel. An Israeli political reorientation could produce just such a loss of in terest.
(The prospective trend, unfortunate Iy, is not towards normal re la t ions with Arabs.
Voice of Israel states:

Foreign Mi ni ster Eba n in hi s book

What we aspire to is not the relationship which exists between Leba non and Syria ... (but) to th e relationship between the United States and the Latin American continent ... of economic interaction , bu t a cross
a frankly confessed gulf of historic, cultural, and linguistic differences ... Integration is something to be
avoided •.• (There) is the danger lest the (Oriental immigrants) force Israel to equalize its cultura l level
with that of the neighbori ng world .•. (We) shou Id infuse them wi th on Occidental spiri t, rather tha n allow them to draw us into an unnatural Orientalism.)
I question the right of Israel to pursue a policy of open immigration for all the wo rldls Jews whi Ie Pales tinian Arabs remain displaced. (I refer here to the old refugees.) The Arab exodus began because there was no quasi - government in
the Palestine Arab community, no organized Arab body to manage essential services, because th e few Ara b national
figures had left, because there was no longer an Arab press, no authoritative voice to inspire confi de nc e or to check
fear (in those cases where fear was not warranted). Neither the Bri tish nor the UN provi ded the co ndi tions for imp lementing the UN-established independent Palestinian Arab state.
The exodus was given great impetus by the Irgun massacre of the Arab village of Deir Yassin, by at roci ties perpetuated
by the official Jewish army, the Haganah, upon the villages of Khissas and Sasa, and by Zionist 'urgings ' and 'encouragements I to flee in the Arab towns of Lydda and Ram Ie and the vi Ilages eas t of Tel Aviv -- 'u rg i ng s ' of the ki nd that
the New York Times has described in occupied Jordon in 1967. There were, of course, Arab outrages a ga inst Jews such
as the Hadassah Hospital ambush near Jerusalem, let alone anti-Jewish riots in such distant places as Dama scus, Baghdad and Aden. But the question here is the flight of the Arabs. Whi Ie the J ewish leadership did no t g ive much publicity to Arab atrocities, the Arab radio dwelt on and exaggerated the incidents of Jewish at roci t ies . Instead of inflaming the Arab masses, this increased their readiness to take to fl ight.
Thus the flight carried away nearly the whole of the Arab community from t he partit ioned Jewish state , and Trans-Jordan
took over what was left of the partitioned Arab state afte r Israel had won its new boundaries. (The myth that the only
Zionist atrocity was that of Deir Yassin was d ispelled by the French writer Rony Gabbay in his A Poli t ica l Study of the
Arab-Jewish Confli ct (1959); just as the myth of Arab radios urgi ng the exodus was disposed of by I. F. Sto ne in the
3 August 1967 New York Review of Books on the basis of broadcast monitorings. Both myths are deal t with in the 1965
work Crossroads to Israel by Christopher Sykes.)
Whatever the reasons for their flight, the Pa lestinian Arabs are entitled to their former homes.

(And what can be said
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of Israel's treatment of those Arabs who stayed - - the 'good Arabs' by Israeli reckoning! )
Wri ters sympatheti c to Israel (Peretz, EII is) attes t to the fac t that Israel's position has become i nc reasi ng Iy i nflexib Ie on
the question of repatriation, even on a token scale. In 1949 the UN obtained a promise from Is rael to pe rmit the re turn
of 100,000 of the refugees but the promise was withdrawn shortly thereafter.
Israel should accept, in principle, the right of the Pa lestinian Arabs, and their offspring, to re turn to th eir lands . Th e
practical application of such a policy is another matte r, but the principle is vital. It is gross a rroga nce to urge settling
the refugees in other Arab countries against their wi II by arguing that they would be 'omong the ir ow n' . Th e primary
attachment of many on Arob peasont is to his village , to his home, no t to a pol itico l lobel coiled ' Pa lest ine " o r 'Iraq ' .
His further identification may be with 0 familiar region, and only the n to a na ti ono l stote. Thi s org ume nt would be akin
to telling a displaced Argentinian peasant to settle in Ve nez ue la since bot h peoples speok Span ish .
The refugee question is tied in closely with the issue of Arab borde r raids and Is rael i reprisal s. The terro r raids of th e
Fedayeen in 1955 and 1956 and the more recent al Fa ta h terro r a ct iv ities a re we ll know n, as are such Israeli actions
as the shelling of the Gaza marketplace and the destruct io n of t he Arab vi lI oges of Ki bya and es Samu. It is less well
known that human tragedy lay at the root of many acts of i nfi Itrat ion .
Harry Ellis, in his 1957 book Israel and the Middle East , recounts the sto ry o f the Jordanian vi llage of Q alqilya. The
1948 armistice found Qalqilyo cut off from its lands, its on ly source of liveli hood. In July 1950 the Jewish Kibbutz
Nir Eliahu was set up on Qalqilya's lands. Perhaps more raids we re made from Q alqilya t ha n from a ny o ther spot surrounding Israel. Ellis describes the poverty, the disease, the swarming fl ies, the despai r of Qalq i lya and goes on:
Those pillars marked the boundary between Jorda n a nd Israe l, a nd those fields of du ll green olive groves
and the brighter green of orange trees, wherein lay the forme r live li hood of Qa lqilya, now belonged to
Israelites, the farmers of Nir Eliahu ... Impoverished and emb ittered by the loss of th e ir fields, ma ny of
the men of Qalqilya had taken to infiltrating across the border, at fi rst to steal fruit from their own fields,
later, as the weary months dragged on, to commi t sabo tage and in some cases - though the y wou Id not say
this - to kill. I spoke to one villager who had crossed the borde r with his 17 year old so n. The son was
ki lied, and the father made it back with a sma ll coc he of ora nges. One week later, whe n the flour bought
with the oronges was gone, the fother went back to Isroel. He was shot in the legs and crawled back to
Qalqilya. He vowed to me that he would cross the border again as soon as he was well. To these men,
the police of Jordan and the soldiers of the Arab Legion we re e nemies second only to the Israelis. The
government of Jordon had clamped down hard on in filtroto rs, seeking to holt the Israeli reprisal raids
wh i ch i nfi Itration brought. Thus i nfi Itratio n had bee n made a crime by Jordan, punishable by prison
terms up to three years, and dozens of Qalqi lya ns had been arrested by Jordanian police and soldiers.
It would have been humane for Israel to return Q a lq i lya's lands after the 1948 fighting. Failing to do that, Israel also
failed to deal with the underlying dynamics of the infi ltrations and failed to recognize the role of responsible Jordanian
authority in trying to stop the incursions. I srael responded, as it has time and agai n in other sim i lar si tuations, with
systematic large-scale reprisal attacks for the purpose of 'teaching them a lesson'. That the lesson is never learned in
no way leads these single-minded Israeli teachers to revise their teaching methods.
With regard to refugees of the recent conflict, the New York Times of 12 June 1967 reported:
There seems to be little doubt that the 60,000 inhabitants of the three big United Nations camps a round
Jericho were attacked by planes on the second day of the fighting ••• Senior UN officials be lieve that
a pattern of expulsion is emerging. They say the Israeli s appear to be concentrating on pushing out inhabitants of such frontier villages as Qalqilya a nd Tulka rm as well as the inhabitants of the big refugee
camps ... Israeli loudspeakers warned the inhab itants , ' You have two hours to leave. After that we can
not guarantee your safety. '
On 23 June the Times stated:
Israeli Army officials acknowledged that 40% of the bui ldings of Qalqilya had been destroyed .. . Requests by newsmen to visit Qalqi Iya were refused •.. 'Qalqi Iya is dead, ' the Israeli Army spokesman
said.
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The 29 June Times contained a n a rt ic le (very sad and moving to anyone who regards Arabs as human beings) titled" 'Despairing Arabs Return to a Ruined Qalqil ya'. It quoted an announcement by General Dayan that 'at least 50% of the
buildings had been destroyed'. The article continued:
The destruction fa r exceeds tha t in a ny other town on any of the three fronts of the war ... The Mayor was taken
to the city hall (by an Israeli co lo nel ) for what was described as a news conference. Despite protests from the
press , the colonel insisted on answering himself most of the questions put to the Mayor. The colonel (at last
was persuaded to permit) two quest ions to be answered (directly), but he balked when the Mayor was asked
whether there had been any damage to the town after the fighting was over. 'You may not ask that quest ion ,' the colone l said. 'The Mayor is busy. This is the end of the press conference.' A howl of protest
rose from t he corresponde nts, and after several minutes of noisy confusion the question was put to the Mayor.
Mr. Sa bri listened , smiled diplomat icall y a t the colonel and replied with a single word, 'Some'... Many
residents took one look at their shattered homes and then wandered dispiritedly back to the center of the
town, whe re the Israelis were distributi ng water and bread.
This, then, was the reso lution of Qalqil ya . But it is pathological to think that peace can be built on these terms, or
on the terms of Dayan's theory of reprisal s as reported by Burns:
We can set a high pri ce for our blood .•. If the Egyptians did not declar war after the Gaza clash, or the
Jo rdanians afte r Nahhalin, it is a n ind ication that they and the other Arab countries were unable to defeat
Israel.
This is simply begging for a war should the day come when the Arabs ~ defeat Isreal. Burns comments:
Wi th such a man (Dayan) at its head, offensive spirit was rife in the Israeli Army ... Every act of violence
had to be repaid . •• with heav y interest . The result was that the Israeli Defense Forces were a very fine
fig hting o rganization, but one which was always looking for trouble, from the viewpoint of the UN Truce
Supervisory O rganization .
The re prisa l policy is poorly calculated to bring peace. It is seldom reprisal in kind. Generally the reprisal vastly
exceeds the transgrassion which occasioned it, and never gains for long the desired results. Often the reprisals have
fo llowed incidents that we re a consequence of direct provocation by Israel -- such as patrolling right up to the Gaza
Strip Demarcation line; such as marchi ng a company straight towards the Jordan Demarcation line leading the Arab
Legion to think themselves under attack and thus to open fire; such as setting up the ftlke Kibbutz Ketsiot in the demilitarized zone of the Negev which t he Mixed Armistice Commission later discovered to be entirely a unit of the Israeli Anny; such as the 1954 Israeli intelligence operation in Cairo which resulted, among other things, in the bombing of a theater, a trial a nd execution, and the removal of Israel ·s defense mi nister, Pi nchas Lavon, a protege of Ben
Gurion.
It is im portant to understand t ha t Israel' s ge neral stance at any given moment determines in considerable measure the
Arab stance. Under the hard, unyieldi ng leadership of Ben Gurion, the borders were in constant turmoil. But under
Moshe Sharett, and even under Esh ko l for a good part of his prime-ministership, the borders were relatively quiet. It
was the famous • La von Affair' that dealt the death blow to the Sharett government and all the promise of conci liation
that died with it . In t he wake of the ou tcry ove r the execution of the Israeli agents in Egypt, Ben Gurion came back
as Defense Minister (and re-assumed the premiership after the impending elections) a nd a large scale 'retaliation' assault under Gaza was launched. Only after the Gaza attack did Nasser organize the Fedayeen and negotiate the first
arms deal with the Sovi et Union.
To condemn the reprisal policy is not to applaud the raids}and, at times, murders committed in Israel by infi Itrators.
But the actions of, say, a Qalqil ya villager can be put in/context and viewed with some understanding of their motivation (just as the motivation for t he establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine can be appreciated). What can be
said of the Qalqilya villagers can also be said of the Fedayeen. Whi Ie the Israelis called them 'cutthroats and murderers' the Arabs called them 'commandos'. The meaning of the Arab word 'Fedayeen' is 'a participant in forlorn hopes,
a person read~ to give his life for his companions ~ Certainly the Fedayeen did cutthroat activity of a revolting nature.
But they were Palestinian Arabs with a burning se nse of having suffered injustice at Israeli hands. I believe that anyone who passes judgment upon them must examine his attitude toward the American Indi a n, the Mau Mau, the Algerian
rebels and countless guerri 110 forces past and present.
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ON ISRAELI ATTITUDES
The essential point is that the problem of border incursions cannot be solved without tackling all the other problems that
grew out of Israelis establishment. Today the general Israeli attitude is not one likely to find many solutions. There
exists an Israeli arrogance, nurtured by the successful campaigns of 1948, 1956 and 1967, which produces an inability
to see that Israel should yield anything for peace. It is this attitude which on two occasions has tempted Israel to seize
upon provocations and go to war in an attempt to force a settlement on its own terms -- terms that would liquidate boycotts, blockades and border violations without coming to grips with the unresolved and fundamental aspects of the conflict. It is this attitude that allowed its army to act in a way described by Charles Mohr in the 18 June 1967 Times:
It was possible to see the bodies of several hundred Egyptian soldiers along the roads. Most of them were
cut down by strafing Israeli jet p lanes. Many had thrown away their helmets, their weapons and even
their shoes as they abandoned their ruined vehicles and tried to flee westward ... Much of this destruction
was done after the army had become a fleeing mob lacking discipline or the means to defend itself.
(This is not to say that the Israel i army acted in an unusually cruel manner or even approached the outrages of some contemporary armies -- it employed what is probably the usual cruelty in combat and, with the exception of the early
weeks, the Israeli army is apparently a more benign occupation force than most.)
Symptomatic of the Israeli attitude after the recent war was the speech given by Abba Eban at the IS tars for Israel' rally
in New York:
We feel that we have fought and won this battle not for ourselves in Israel alone but for Jewry everywhere,
and in some sma II measure, perhaps for the vindi cation and reassertion of Western democracy.
The meaning of such 'reassert!ons l requi res no explanation in contemporary Vietnam or Santo Domingo.
The fact that foreign coloniz e rs establ ish certain democrati c structures is completel y irrelevant to the question of the
indigenous people's rights. The communal nature of the Israeli kibbutz and Israelis tolerance of Communist parties (one
Arab, one Jewish) neither reflect the essence of power in Israe I nor, more importantl y, do they serve as measuri ng rods
for an appraisal of Middle East realities. The reactionary nature of most of the present Arab regimes is also irrelevant.
What is bound to be on the agenda in that part of the world is the question of ending imperialist control, of preventing
its re-establishment, of the development and productivization of the Arab peoples through their utilization of their
own resources and talents. r h~ cruc ial question for Israel is how it positions itself in relation to these struggles.
It may well be that the price )f the continued existence of a state that was born unnaturally is extreme patience in the
face of threats and provocah ,ns, and great political skill in the face of hostility. It is an historic sorrow that such difficult efforts should be requind of the Jews, of all people. It was with great emotion and deep feelings (which I shared)
that the survivors of the European horror viewed the birth of Israel only three years later. But only such patience afld
skill can possibly lead to the survival of a Jewish community in Southwest Asis.
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3 (13th line from bottom) should be: direst (not direct)
5 {2nd line from bottom} should be: July 1938 (not 1948)
8 {7th line from top} should be alien en10 (lOth line from bottom) should be: 22 October 1957 {not 1967}
13 {l 'lth line from bottom} should be: upon {not under}

